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ARISTOTLE’S RELATIONS: AN INTERPRETATION IN
COMBINATORY LOGIC
ERWIN ENGELER
Abstract
The usual modelling of the syllogisms of the Organon by a calculus of classes does
not include relations. Aristotle may however have envisioned them in the first two
books as the category of relatives, where he allowed them to compose with them-
selves. Composition is the main operation in combinatory logic, which therefore
offers itself to logicians for a new kind of modelling. The resulting calculus includes
also composition of predicates by the logical connectives.
Introduction
Relations turn up at birthdays,1 congratulating. Even logicians have them; of the
first one, Aristotle, we even know some of their names. But it is a question among
historians of axiomatic geometry whether he had the other kind of relations, the
ones that modern logicians are concerned with. Indeed, many hold that the Stagirite
did not have this concept, and that Greek mathematics, in particular Euclid shows
this: the relation of betweenness does not enter his axioms for geometry. The
tradition of Aristotelian Logic is often blamed for this serious lacuna. In fact
Euclidean axiomatics reached completion only in the 19th century, [4]. Missing
the concept of relation is perceived as making it unfit as an adequate logic for
developing formal axiomatic mathematics; that had to wait till the Boole-Peano-
Russell disruption which eclipsed traditional logic. This, I think, is overstating the
case. The Organon itself gives a picture of Aristotle’s understanding of judgements
other than those that are formulated by the syllogistics and included relations and
functionals. My argument comes in two parts, motivation and formal development.
The first part experiments with concepts of definitions on an example that Aristotle
himself could have handled. These are discussed in terms, motives, that I discern
in the Organon, in particular the composition of predicates called “relatives”, the
use of logical connectives and forms of recursion. Modalities, also an important
ingredient of the Organon are not included here, which while feasible are irrelevant
to the present theme. In the second part, the compositional aspect of predicates
is brought forward and made into the basis for interpreting the Organon. This
results in the establishment of a logical calculus EΛ of judgements. This provides a
model of syllogisms which include relations. The conclusion is, that Aristotle had
the means to treat relations but chose not to do so for his syllogistics.
Date: July 9, 2020.
1 The first part of his little essay was written as a gift for my 90th birthday, (see dedication).
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1 Aristotle’ Relatives
If you’ll bear with me, let us see how Aristotle would, and could speak of his
relatives, formally, and within the framework of his toolkit, the Organon — in my
naive and quite ahistoric reading, using an ad hoc formalism that we shall later
turn into a formal calculus.
1.1 Predication
The main grammatical operation is applying a predicate to a subject: [red] · [blood]
is a statement which predicates that blood is red. All kinds of thought objects
are admitted as predicates; Aristotle divides them into “categories”, distinguishing
for example between predicates about quantity (“big”), and quality (“red”) and
relatedness, (the category of “relatives”).
Looking at example of relatives, let [mother ] predicate of a subject that it is enjoy-
ing motherhood. Thus [mother] · [Phastia] states that Phastia is a mother. Nothing
prevents us from using this thought object as a predicate:
([mother] · [Phastia]) · [Aristotle]
tells us that Phastia is the mother of Aristotle. This turn is what Aristotle (Cate-
gories, Chapt.7) really meant with the category of relatives; he in fact called this
category “things pointing towards something”. The above predicate [mother] of
motherhood predicates of a subject a that the subject b is her child, “pointing a to
b”. Thus, a relative predicate in fact introduces a binary relation by composition of
predicates. The compositional nature of relatives is an early showing of Currying,
a device that became one of the central aspects of combinatory logic.
For the moment, we don’t concern ourselves with the question as to what category
some predicate or subject might belong, all are treated as relatives; one of the uses
that Aristotle gets out of such prescriptions is to avoid predicating nonsense by
disqualifying predications between certain categories.
Using the “relative” predications of motherhood and fatherhood, of marriage, and
of being male or female applied to family members, we can easily envision the ge-
nealogy of Aristotle as a list of such statements. He himself would use many more
predicates to talk about his relations: he would use “son”, “sister”, “grandfather”,
“sister-in-law”, or even “male descendent” etc. as predicative concepts. Let us see
how that could fit in.
1.2 Explicit Definitions
One way of introducing a new predicative concept is explicitly, as composite
predicates. Using variables a, b, c, . . . for subjects, the definition of b being a child
of a is simply
([child] · b) · a = ([mother] · a) · b.
For some relationships we need logical connectives such as “and” and “or”. These
are denoted by ∧ and ∨, and used on predicates P and Q to obtain P ∧ Q and
P ∨Q. Thus, the predicate of being a “son” is
([son] · b) · a = ([mother] · a) · b ∧ [male]b,
Similarly, constituting the predicative concept of a “family”: For a, b, c, d to form a
core family, predicated by the predicate [family] on some individuals a, b, c, d set
[family]abcd = [mother]ac∧ [mother]ad∧ [father]bc∧ [father]bd∧ [female]a∧ [male]b.
Notation: we have dropped the center-dot that denotes application and adhere to
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the convention that sequences of applications are to be understood as parenthesised
to the left: uvw is read as (u · v) · w, etc.
The idea of “pointing to something” has just been applied again: if Pa is a relative
predication then Pa and Pab may be too. P in the context Pabc, for example,
would introduce a ternary relation. This leads to a more general notion of explicit
definitions:
Formally, an explicit definition concerns an expression ϕ(x1, x2, . . . xn) built up from
variables, predicates (introduced earlier as definienda) and the logical connectives.
It defines a new predicate P by the defining equation
Px1x2 . . . xn = ϕ(x1, x2, . . . , xn).
This is the Principle of Comprehension. It comprehends the connective structure
of ϕ into a single predicate, an idea that goes back to Scho¨nfinkel and is a basic
concept for Curry’s combinatory logic.
1.3 Implicit Definitions
As ethnologists tell us, all, (even “primitive”) cultures allow definitions of famil-
ial relatedness, some quite elaborate. The simplest ones are of the explicit kind as
above, but this is far from sufficient. Consider the notion of being (maternal) sib-
lings. The desired predicate [sibling]cd hides a mother somewhere in its definition.
Aristotle resolves this by introducing the construction “some P”.
We denote the construct “some P” by εx(Px). It implies a sort of existential ref-
erent. The assertion “some P are Q” would then transcribe to Q · (εx(Px)). This
device was introduced by Hilbert to be used in his foundational program as a tool
for the formal elimination of quantifiers. With it we can define the predicate of
being a sibling:
[sibling]yz = [mother](εx([mother]xy))z,
stating that y’s mother x is also mother of z.
1.4 Recursion
We now can have uncles, cousins of all kinds, marriages between them, etc.,
enough to tell the story of Aristotle’s relations, and formulate things like “Aristotle
is the father-in-law of his niece”. However, the concept “male descendent” which
was very important at the time is still open. This is a typical case for using a
definition by recursion:
[mdesc]xy = ([male]y ∧ [father]xy) ∨ (εz([father]zy ∧ [mdesc]xz))
stating that a male descendent y of x either is a son of x or there is some male
descendent who is his father.
Are such definitions admissible? What it amounts to, is that it allows the use of the
ε-operator also for predicates as variables: The definiendum [mdesc] is represented
by a variable U .
[mdesc]xy = εU (([male]y ∧ [father]xy) ∨ (εz([father]zy ∧ Uxz)))
You may have noticed that the ε operator allows to understand the Aristotelean
“some P are Q” as Q · (εxPx) in the present ad hoc formalism. We have not used
two other basic ingredients of Aristotle’s formalism; there was no need of negation
and of the companion to “some x are y”, namely “all x are y”. This will be be task
of a later chapter.
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2 Discussion
2.1 On the Organon
For all I know, Aristotle would have accepted each definiens in the above def-
initions as a statement in his sense. But he would have hesitated to call them
“categorical” statements. The distinction arises in the course of his development
of the Organon2.
The Organon, the way I read it, has the character of a manual, a texbook that in-
structs the reader in the art of preparing a conclusive argument using well-formed
and immediately understandable statements. The Organon consists of three parts,
“The Categories”, “On Interpretation” and “Prior Analytics” (in two books).3
The first two introduce the notion of well-formed-ness by a discourse of examples
and grammatical distinctions. The question is how to combine predicates while
evading non-sensical, ambiguous or misunderstandable compositions as far as pos-
sible: How do you compose [good], [man] and [shoemaker] (Int 11) ?
You may take conjunction and application to form
([good]∧ [shoemaker])[man] or ([good][shoemaker])[man] or [shoemaker]([good][man])
or ([good][man])[shoemaker],
each with a valid and different meaning,.
Disjunction can enter with predicates of the category of qualities such as colour;
([black] ∨ [white])[man], (Cat 8), or
([green] ∨ [blue])[turquoise], or [green]([blue][turquoise]) or ([blue][green])[turquoise],
as you may judge the quality of the stone.
Negation enters in two pairs of opposites (Cat 10, Int 6-10):
“some P are Q” as against “no P is Q”, and
“all P are Q” as against “some P are not Q”.
These are the four kinds of statements that Aristotle calls categorical statements.
In Prior Analytics, Aristotle gets down to the business of constructing conclu-
sive sequences of arguments. Already required for categorical statements, each
argument should be terse and immediately understandable. He chose to restrict
the form of statements to the four categorical ones above, which for convenience
we denote in the form ϕ(x, y), ψ(x, y), etc.
And then he shows unguem leonis4: he develops a formal system of logic based on
logical arguments, called syllogism, of the form
ϕ(P,Q), ψ(Q,R) ⊢ χ(P,R),
expressing that from the categorical statements ϕ(P,Q) and ψ(Q,R) you may in-
fer χ(P,R), (PA A 1 - 14). Since there are four of these, there is a plethora of
such deductive patterns. Aristotle proceeds to eliminate all but fourteen of them
by showing, using counterexamples, which of them preserve the truth of the state-
ments.
The high point of Prior Analytics is the proof of a metatheorem: all fourteen can
be deduced from just two of them, (PA A 23).
2Consulted translations: Owen [7] and Smith [10].
3These are cited as (Cat), (Int), (PA A), (PA B) with only the chapters indicated, e.g. (Cat
8) is Chapter 8 in Categories.
4 “Writing with the the claws of a lion.”
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2.2 Critiques of the Organon
By this metatheorem, Aristotle establishes a sort of completeness for his syllo-
gistic proof system. This is different from the present notion of completeness in
mathematical logic which involves models.
The story of models for Aristotle’s logic can be traced from Boole’s Laws of
Thoughts, to  Lukasiewicz [6], Shepherdson [9] and Corcoran [1] in the 20th century.
The view developed that this logic dealt with unary truth-functions which could be
understood as classes. To accomodate the interpretation of categorical sentences,
the classes had to be non-empty. Corcoran, for example, interpreted these as:
“all A are B” is: A ⊆ B,
“no A is B” is: A ∩B = ∅,
“some A are B” is: A ∩B 6= ∅,
“some A are not B” is: A 6⊆ B.
With such interpretations, syllogistic may be treated as a calculus of equations [9],
something that Boole seems to have had in mind. It reflects a rather impoverished
Organon. But if people considered this sort of models as the true interpretation
of Aristotle, there is no place for relations, and the opinion that he therefore is
responsible for the lacunae of Euclidean axiomatics gets some support.
Scholars of Euclidean axiomatics such as de Risi [3], do not share this opinion:
Aristotle, an alumnus of Plato’s academy, where famously nobody entered without
it, did know geometry. Prior Analytics contains a geometric proof of the equality
of base angles in an equilateral triangle,(PA A 26), and “the principle of Aristotle”
of Euclidean tradition is related to parallelity.
Posterior Analytics (Chapter 19), reflects Aristotle’s understanding of recursion
as a mentally completed inductive definition of a concept. “Mental completion”
is hard to understand without a set-theoretic mindset, and it was a controversial
issue for many commentators of Aristotle.5
Logic definitely turned away from the Aristotelian tradition only at the turn to
the 20th century. Bertrand Russell was an important mover in this. He had learned
classical logic as a student but also had read up on Leibniz’s attempts at reforming
logic, critically. He asked himself several questions inspired by this reading, in
particular one that is relevant here:
“(1) Are all propositions reducible to the subject-predicate form?” [ 8, p.13 ] 6
On the following pages of this book he proceeds to demonstrate by examples, that
a logic adequate for mathematics cannot dispense with relations. Indeed later, in
Principia Mathematica they are a central ingredient.
5It was therefore only settled after the creation of set theory.
6I’m grateful to Prof. V. de Risi for pointing me to this book in recent correspondence.
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3 The Organon in Combinatory logic
An adequate mathematical model for more of Aristotle’s logic seems to be miss-
ing. This section describes my attempt to construct one.
Logicians who have followed me to this place have long noticed that the ad hoc
formalism that I introduced in the discussion of Aristotle’s family is in fact an
extension of combinatory logic. Predicates, logical concepts and operations were
added to the language by defining equations in these terms, combined with the
combinatory application operation. This will now be turned into a formal calculus
based on a language E which extends the language of combinatory logic.
Before introducing this language, we choose a mathematical structure into which
the language will be interpreted. Because it includes combinatory logic, we need a
model for that.
3.1 The Modelling Structure
The Language E of the modelling extends that of combinatory logic.
We first consider a fragment E0 of E . It consists of expressions, built from variables
and constant predicates by the operations of application, the epsilon operator εx
and the alpha operator αx for variables x. These operations bind the variable x.
We shall distinguish between objects that are called predicates and predications. A
predication may be obtained by applying a predicate P to a variable x, “predicating
something about x”, written P · x.
The basis for our interpretation of the language E0 is the graph-model of com-
binatory logic, Scott (1969), Plotkin (1972), Engeler (1981).
Let A be a non-empty set and define recursively
G0(A) = A,Gn+1(A) = A ∪ {α→ a : α finite or empty, α ⊆ Gn(A), a ∈ G(A)},
where α→ a is a notation for the pair 〈α, a〉.
The union of these Gn(A) is denoted by G(A).
The combinatory application operation is defined on subsets M and N of G(A) as
M ·N = {x : α→ x ∈M,α ⊆ N}.
With this interpretation of the application operation, the set G(A) can be shown
to be a model of combinatory logic. The elements of the model are the subsets of
G(A). We shall show below that the model satisfies the Comprehension Axiom of
Combinatory Logic:
For every expression ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) built up by the application operation from the
constants and variables (interpreted as subsets of G(A)), there exists an element
M of the model such that
M · x1 · x2 · · · · xn = ϕ(x1, . . . , xn).
The proof of this theorem actually produces an algorithm of comprehension to
obtain M . Observe that all elements of M have the form
α1 → (α2 → . . . (αn → a)) with αi ⊆ G(A) finite or empty, and a ∈ G(A).
For the next steps we shall rely on Scho¨nfinkel’s comprehension theorem. He
shows that if we have the “combinators” S andK for which the equations SPQR =
PQ(PR) and KPQ = Q hold for all predicates P,Q,R, then there is the following
conversion:
Comprehension Theorem of Combinatory Logic
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For every combinatory expression ϕ(x1, . . . xn) built up from constants and the
variables xi there is a purely applicative expression ψ(S,K) such that
((((ψ(S,K) · x1) · x2) · · · )xn = ϕ(x1, . . . , xn).
For completing the proof we need only produce interpretations of the two constants
and show, by inspection, that these conform to the equations, and thereby verify
that by our interpretation we have in fact a model of combinatory logic. This is
done in this author’s 1981 paper on graph models, [5]. Here are the interpretations
of the two combinators:
[K] = {{a} → (∅ → a) : a ∈ G(A)},
[S] = {({τ → ({r1, . . . , rn} → s)} → ({σ1 → r1, . . . σn → rn} →
(σ → s))) : n ≥ 0, r1, . . . , rn ∈ G(A), τ ∪ σ1 ∪ · · · ∪ σn = σ ⊆ G(A), σ finite}.
3.2 The Combinatory Interpretation of Categorical Predication
Combinatory Predicates are composed by the operation of application from pred-
icate constants Cj and variables xi to form expressions ϕ(C1, . . . , Cm, x1, . . . xn).
The constants Cj are interpreted as subsets [Cj ] of G(A), each variable xi ranges
over a specific subset of G(A). Their mention in ϕ is usually suppressed.
Some predicates can be used for predications : If the predicate P is interpreted
as [P ], a subset of G(A), and [P ] is a set of elements of G(A) of the form
(α1 → (α2 → . . . (αn → a)) with a ∈ G(A), αi ⊆ G(A) finite or empty, i = 1, . . . , n,
then [P ] can act as a predication [P ] · [x1] · · · [xn] on these variables, interpreted as
subsets [xi] of G(A).
Notation : Where no ambiguity results we may omit the brackets on interpreted
variables in the future.
The intuition behind this interpretation of predication is that [P ] as a predication
expresses some facts about each subject-variable xi. These facts are the extent
to which xi conforms to the predicate P , the conformity being expressed by the
corresponding sets αi. We call these facts “attributes”.
An interpretation of a predication is perhaps best illustrated by an example which
we take from the family context of section 1. The interpretation of the parent
predicate [parent(x, y)] is a set of expressions (α1 → (α2 → a)) with α1, α2 ⊆
G(A), a ∈ A, and where A is a set of people, each is present with the individual
attributes. – In distinction to section 1 we added the variables inside the the
brackets for clarity, they relate the variables x, y to the sets α1, α2 in that order.
Each set αi is understood as a set of attributes: α1 of being a parent, α2 of being
a child.
The meaning of the predication [parent(x, y)] · [x] · [y] therefore is: “[y] is the set
of people in A for whom [x] is a set of parents”. Specifically: α1 is the set of
expressions {x} → ({z} → z) for x male, {y} → ({z} → z) for female, and α2
consists of all {z} → z for the children z, with x, y, z ∈ A. The predication produces
the children of x and y if x is male and y female.
Categorical Predicates, the analog to the categorical statements in the Organon,
arise from combinatory predicates by using “for some” and “for all”, referring to
the variables of a predicate. They constitute our language E0. We use εxϕ(x) to
denote “some x has ϕ(x)” and αxϕ(x) to denote “all x have ϕ(x)”.
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Extending the modelling to the ε-operator is a bit subtle. The term εxϕ(x) is to
be interpreted as the result of a recursion in the sense of “completed induction”.
Recall that the modelling of the language E0 is a process of finding denotations for
elements of the language in a combinatory model. The modelling of εxϕ(x) involves
the determination of an object F , a subset of G(A), which has the property ϕ(F ).
“Recursion” means that such an object is already determined by an object F0, the
basis of recursion. This implies that the process of interpretation calls here for the
choice of a particular object F0, which, as the case may be, is a challenge for the
ingenuity of the modeller.
Given a unary predicate P , the object [εx(Px)] is therefore determined by the inter-
pretation, which proposes an initial set F0 ⊆ G(A) with the property F0 ⊆ [P ] ·F0,
and yields
[εx(Px)] =
⋃
n[P ]
nF0 = F , [P ]
n denoting the n-th iteration.
Then F is a fixpoint of [P ], noting [P ] · F = F .
The finding of an appropriate F0 is the cardinal point on which it turns whether or
not the interpretation of the predication becomes vacuous, (see e.g. 4.1 below on
the existence of a model for projective geometry). F0 always exists, determined by
the interpretation, in the worst case it is F0 = F = ∅.
The α-operator is interpreted as
[αx(Px)] = [P ] · ext[P ]([x]), where ext[P ]([x]) = {a : ∃α → a ∈ [P ]} is the set of
possible values for [P ]x.
The Aristotelian “some P are Q” thus translates into [Q] · [εx(Px)] and “all P are
Q” into [Q] · [αx(Px)].
To extend these operations to n-ary predications we make another use of compre-
hension to separate out a specific variable in an expression ϕ(x1, . . . , xn):
(ϕj(x1, . . . , xn) · x1 · · ·xj−1 · xj+1 · · ·xn) · xj = ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) · x1 · · ·xn
The ε -operator and α -operators for n-ary predicates [ϕ] are defined accordingly :
[εxj(ϕj(x1, . . . , xn))] ·x1 · · ·xj−1 ·xj+1 · · ·xn = F , where, for F0 given by the inter-
pretation,
F =
⋃
m([ϕj(x1, . . . , xn)] · x1 · · ·xj−1 · xj+1 · · ·xn)
m · F0.
F is a set function with n− 1 variables.
[αxj ([ϕj(x1, . . . , xn))] · x1 · · ·xj−1 · xj+1 · · ·xn
= [ϕj(x1, . . . , xn)] · x1 · · ·xj−1 · xj+1 · · ·xn · ext[ϕj ]([xj ]), where
ext[ϕj]([xj ]) = {a : ∃(α1 → · · · → (αn → a)) ∈ [ϕj(x1, . . . , xn))]}.
Remark: Two categorical statements “no P is Q” and “some P are not Q” are
missing in E0. They are added in the next section in the context of negation. This
is an expository choice. In fact they could have been added here separately, which
would make E0 the full categorical language.
3.3 The Interpretation of Logical Connectives and Truth
Predications as defined above are “factual” interpretations, they produce a set
of facts [P ] · x1 · · ·xn. Our interpretation of the language E0 resulted in a calculus
of facts and as such cannot really be called a logical calculus. It lacks the logical
connectives and judgements about the truth of a predication.
Predications lend themselves to logical composition by the connectives ∧,∨ and ¬.
These constitute a language extension E of E0. The interpretation is extended to
E recursively on the structure of the logical composition: the evaluation of
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[ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)]x1 · · ·xn ∧ [ψ(x1, . . . , xn)]x1 · · ·xn is
[ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)]x1 · · ·xn ∩ [ψ(x1, . . . , xn)]x1 · · ·xn,
correspondingly with ∨ and ∪, where we conformed the two predications to com-
bined variables x1, . . . , xn by comprehension.
For negation we set [¬ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)]x1 · · ·xn = ext[ϕn]([xn])−[ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)]x1 · · ·xn.
This concludes the definition of the logical predications. In particular, we can now
express all the syllogistic statements “some P are Q”, . . . , “some P are not Q”,
and our ad hoc formalism in section 1 is thereby legitimised.
Observation: The operation of negation could have been added separately in
the definition of the language E0 which would make it possible to add to it the two
missing categorical statements “no P is Q” and “some P are not Q”. The extended
language E thus includes the full Aristotelian language of categorical statements.
The intuition behind our Truth Definition for a unary predicate P , modelled
by a set of expressions αi → a is that [P ]x is true if x has all the attributes that
are required by P , that is [P ]x = {a : α → a ∈ [P ]}. Correspondingly the truth
definition for arbitrary predications in E is
[ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)x1 · · ·xn is true, denoted by ⊤,
if [ϕj(x1, . . . , xn)x1 · · ·xj−1 · xj+1 · · ·xn · xj = ext[ϕj]([xj ]) for each j.
[ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)x1 · · ·xn is false, denoted by ⊥,
if it is a proper non-empty subset of ext[ϕj ]([xj ]) for some j.
In all other cases it is indeterminate, denoted by △.
3.4 Relational Predications: From Factual to Logical Interpreta-
tion
The “facts” produced by predications [P ] ·xi · · ·xn in E do not reflect the actual
relations between the arguments xi. This can be accomplished by introducing
relational predications [PR]: If [P ] consists of elements(α1 → · · · → (αn → a)) with
a ∈ G(A), αi ⊆ G(A) finite and nonempty, then
[P ]R · x1 · · ·xn is the set of all 〈a1, . . . , an〉 : ∃(α1 → · · · → (αn → a)) ∈ [P ]
such that ai ⊆ xi ⊆ αi, i = 1, . . . , n. The subscript R is tacitly understood in the
following.
Let E be extended to EΛ(C1, . . . , Cm) by introducing a valuation of the relational
predicate constants C1, . . . , Cm of E .
The factual interpretation of relational predications distinguishes items that
verify or falsify it. This distinction is based on a valuation Λi for each one of
the constant predicates [Ci]. We denote the valuation of a tuple 〈a1, . . . , an〉 by
〈a1, . . . , an〉Λi = 〈a1, . . . , an〉⊤ if it is a verifying fact, by 〈a1, . . . , an〉⊥ if it is falsi-
fying.
For a n-ary predicate constants [Ci] the facts that are valued by the valuation Λi
are the tuples 〈a1, . . . , an〉 ∈ Di , where
Di = {〈a1, . . . , an〉 : (α1 → . . . (αn−1 → aj)) ∈ [(Ci)j ], j = 1, . . . , n}
We define the corresponding predication [Ci]
Λi by the set of objects
(α1 → . . . (αn → 〈a1, . . . , an〉)Λi where
(α1 → (α2 → · · · → (αn → an))) ∈ [Ci], 〈a1, . . . , an〉 ∈ Di.
As a result, the factual interpretation of the relational predication Ci is the set
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function [Ci]
Λi · x1 · · ·xn which produces a set containing elements 〈a1, . . . , an〉⊤,
〈a1, . . . , an〉⊥ and △, (for the cases where the predication returns the empty set on
the given inputs x1, . . . , xn).
The factual interpretation of the language EΛ(C1, . . . , Cm) is based on the val-
uation Λi for each Ci, and then extended over logical composition, the ε- and
α-operations and the quantifiers ∃ and ∀ as follows: The valuation Λ maps each
predication into a set of the above objects. We represent each such set as a proposi-
tional formula consisting of the valued tuples 〈a1, . . . , an〉. The valuation Λ assigns
to each of them the truth-value true or false as indicated by the superscripts. To
obtain the truth-value of a constant predication, the set produced by it is inter-
preted as the conjunction of these elements as a formula in a propositional logic.
The presence of △ in a propositional formula assigns to it the value indeterminate.
This interpretation is then extended as follows to predications obtained by the log-
ical operations:
The conjunction and disjunction of predications [ϕ(x1, . . . xn)]
Λ · x1 · · ·xn and
[ψ(y1, . . . ym)]
Λ · y1 · · · ym are conjunctions respectively disjunctions of the corre-
sponding propositional expressions. The interpretation of negation is obtained by
inverting all ⊤ to ⊥ and all ⊥ to ⊤ in the valuations of the tuples 〈a1, . . . , an〉
⊤,
〈a1, . . . , an〉⊥.
The factual interpretation of the ε- and α operators on a predicate ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)
is obtained as
[εxj(ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)]
Λ · x1 · · ·xj−1 · xj+1 · · ·xn
= {〈a1, . . . , aj−1, aj+1, . . . , an, aj〉
⊤ :
aj ∈ [εxj (ϕj(x1, . . . , xn)]
Λ · x1 · · ·xj−1 · xj+1 · · ·xn · xj},
[αxj (ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)]
Λ · x1 · · ·xj−1 · xj+1 · · ·xn
= {〈a1, . . . , aj−1, aj+1, . . . , an, aj〉⊤ :
aj ∈ [ϕj(x1, . . . , xn)]Λ · x1 · · ·xj−1 · xj+1 · · ·xn · ext[ϕj]([xj ])}
∪ {〈a1, . . . , aj−1, aj+1, . . . , an, aj〉⊥ :
aj ∈ [¬ϕj(x1, . . . , xn)]Λ · x1 · · ·xj−1 · xj+1 · · ·xn · ext[ϕj]([xj ])}.
Existential and universal quantifiers can now be introduced as follows:
[∃xjϕ(x1, . . . , xn)]Λ · x1 · · ·xj−1 · xj+1 · · ·xn
= [εxj (ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)]
Λ · x1 · · ·xj−1 · xj+1 · · ·xn,
[∀xjϕj(x1, . . . , xn)]Λ · x1 · · ·xj−1 · xj+1 · · ·xn
= [αxj (ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)]
Λ · x1 · · ·xj−1 · xj+1 · · ·xn.
Altogether, we have now extended the factual interpretation of predications to
all of the language EΛ(C1, . . . , Cm). Each predication produces a propositional
formula containing elements of the form 〈a1, . . . , an〉⊥, 〈a1, . . . , an〉⊤ and △. This
completes the factual interpretation of EΛ(C1, . . . , Cm); it assigns a propositional
formula of verifying, falsifying tuples and △-s.
The truth-value of the predication is obtained by evaluating the tuples of the propo-
sitional components as true, false and indeterminate as above.
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4 Discussion
4.1 Projective Geometry
Looking for an example to discuss our interpretation E and EΛ of the Organon,
recall Plato’s advice in the Republic, (Chapter VII), that with geometry you can
educate the mind.
We take “geometry” here as a first-order theory in mathematical logic, and for
simplicity restrict to projective geometry.
The first-order models in mathematical logic are relational structures
〈A,R1, . . . , Rn, c1, . . . , cn〉 with relations Ri ⊆ Aki and individual constants cj ∈ A.
In our modelling the relations Ri correspond to combinatory constants that denote
ki-ary predicates; the constants cj also correspond to combinatory constants. These
objects are then interpreted as subsets of G(A) according to the above definitions.
As an example, consider a mathematical structure such as a projective plane, un-
derstood as a set P of “points”, L as a set of “lines” with the binary relation of
“incidence” Inc ⊆ P ×L, where P ∩L = ∅. These are subject to some axioms such
as: “For any two points there is a unique line on which they are incident.”
The combinatory model is based on this A for the construction of G(A). In E the
incidence relation is interpreted as
[Inc]Λ = {({p} → ({p} → l))→ ({p} → l) : p ∈ P, l ∈ L, 〈p, l〉 ∈ Inc}.
In EΛ(Inc) it would be
[Inc]Λ = {({p} → ({p} → l))→ ({p} → 〈p, l〉) : p ∈ P, l ∈ L, 〈p, l〉 ∈ Inc}
An equality predicate is needed here only for points and lines and can therefore be
viewed as a binary predicate constant with the interpretation
[eq] = {({x} → ({y} → y))→ ({y} → y) : x = y, x, y ∈ P ∪ L} in E ,
with the corresponding the relational predication
[eq]Λ = {({x} → ({y} → y))→ ({x} → 〈x, y〉) : x = y, x, y ∈ P ∪ L} in EΛ .
Using the quantifiers introduced earlier, the above axiom is interpreted as
∀x1∀x2([eq]Λx1x2∨∃y([Inc]Λx1y∧[Inc]Λx2y∧∀z([¬Inc]Λx1z∨[¬Inc]Λx2z∨[eq]Λyz))).
with the parameter [Inc]. – The other axioms would be represented in the same
fashion and combined into a logical predicate denoted by pi(Inc). It then turns into
an exercise of inventiveness in finding the required fixpoints, and of formal persis-
tence to verify that it returns the value true on some given model of projective
plane geometry, that is for a given binary relation of incidence, e.g. the Fano plane
of seven points and seven lines.
Of course, projective geometry itself may be considered as a defined predicate,
obtained by using a suitably defined recursion on a predication: Let the variable
X be substituted for Inc in the axiom-expression pi(Inc) . The recursion equation
X = εXpi(X)) defines the geometric concept of a projective plane. The modelling
of this formula starts with fixing on a given set of points and lines, these may come
from defniitions in terms of finite fields or Q,R or C. Here again the modelling
consists in the finding of a fixpoint, which is the crucial matter in obtaining an
actual model. If the language has more than one predicate constant, e.g. one for
betweenness, one would of course use joint recursion for incidence and betweenness.
Remark : Perhaps it is worth mentioning that this use of the predicate pi(X) is an
example of introducing additional predicate constants with which one may extend
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the language to encompass additional concepts. This corresponds to the familiar
way to define new mathematical concepts and structures.
4.2 Facts and Thoughts
The restriction of “facts” to the the basic set A as the extension of the variables
is natural in simple contexts like the Aristotle family. We also used it in the context
of projective geometry treating of ”facts” about points and lines. But this is too
restrictive even in this case: Consider the notion of point-functions, for example
projectivities. The object f is a point-function if fpq1 = fpq2 for all q1, q2 ∈ P .
This can be expressed by a predication [fun] defined by
[fun]f = [eq] · αq1 (fpq1) · αq2(fpq2),
using the predication [eq] from above. Observe that [fun] is an element of G2(A).
The ε-operator also creates “facts”: Consider the line connecting two point p1, p2,
expressed by εl([eq] · [Inc](p1l) · (p2l)),
which is a function on p1, p2, called a Skolem-function in logic. It is an element of
G2(A).
A “Skolem-function” f is thus the result of a recursion, a concept that we traced
back to Aristotle’s notion of a mentally completed definition of induction. It is
therefore legitimate to call this object a thought. – Anyway, I would have preferred
“thoughts” over “predicates” and “predications”. The latter are naturals in the
Aristotelean context. But I see predicates as thoughts, as sets or patterns of small
and big notions: The predication [P ] · x is perceived as applying a thought P to a
thought x, checking to what extent the thought [P ] applies to x. This perception
is the background of my modelling and is connected to my work on neural algebra
which treats of thoughts as patterns of firing neurons.
4.3 Algorithmic Logic
Let me not forget my own brain-child, algorithmic logic, [4], now approaching
retirement age after a long career. It treats of algorithmic properties of structures.
Its predicates are of the form pi(x1, . . . , xn) which denotes a program pi with the
input variables x1, . . . xn of elements of the structure. Since combinatory logic can
deal with the notions of computation and termination, there is an important point
of contact here which merits elaboration.
Programs pi(x1, . . . , xn) are composed of individual instructions, namely assign-
ments of the form z := f(x, y), decisions such as x < y. These correspond, loosely
speaking, to our predicate constants. Program statements are composed by succes-
sive execution (pi1(x1, . . . , xn)); (pi(2x1, . . . , xn)) and recursion. These essentially
correspond to composition and the ε-operation. Finally, the factual interpretation
[pi(x1, . . . , xn)]
Λ · x1 · · ·xn of a program is the so-called denotational semantics of
the program. The valuation Λ is understood as the valuation of tuples of elements
of the relations and functions in some relational structure. The program statement
[pi(x1, . . . , xn)]
Λx1 · · ·xn evaluates to the result of executing the program on the
input assignment.
For the logic of programs, the “algorithmic logic”, we chose to evaluate a program
as “true” in a relational structure if it halts on all inputs.
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5 Conclusions and Scholia
5.1 On the discussion of Aristotle’s Relations
This discussion may be conducted in the interpretation of the language EΛ in
section 3.4 above which captures, extends and completes the ad hoc formalism used
in our motivational section 1. The example fits nicely into this framework: The set
A lists the names of the members of the family. The binary relations for mother-
hood, fatherhood and marriage are lists of pairs of names, and singletons for being
male or female. Thus, the interpretation [father]Λ for fatherhood is a case of bi-
nary relations which are represented in the form
{{x} → ({y} → y))→ ({x} → 〈x, y〉).
Therefore fatherhood in the Aristotle family would be represented by a set contain-
ing the substitution instances
x := Niarchus1, y := Aristotle and x := Niarchus1, y := Arimnestus
as well as x := Aristotle, y := Niarchus2.
A more adequate modelling of fatherhood would need more attributes from of the
vital statistics of the family members, e.g. profession, place and date of birth, etc.
to exclude false claims of fatherhood. Above, we have artificially distinguished the
two people called “Niarchus” by adding the distinction to the names.
In this setting it becomes clear that Aristotle had the conceptual means to con-
ceive of, and formally treat, relations. But the primary goal of the Organon did
not require this.
This concludes our search for Aristotle’s relations. The missing relations of
Euclid, a blemish on his axioms, were not noticed at the time because geometry
was understood by Aristotle as describing geometric properties of lines and other
objects unquestioned as continuous. As pointed out by de Risi in [2 ] this was only
put into question in the 16th century and not fully received into the understanding
of space till the 19th century.7
5.2 Scholia
What have we learned from our combinatory experiment on the Organon ?
I: The objects of syllogisms, the categorical statements, were interpreted as ele-
ments of the language E which expands the set of terms of combinatory logic. This
combinatory interpretation thus becomes a model of syllogistics comparable to the
models of  Lucasiewicz and others.
II: The categorical statements themselves are statements about properties of facts,
traditionally about individual facts. This aspect is captured by our language E .
III: The logical interpretation of the language EΛ(C1, . . . , Cm) is based on facts
about relations as n-ary predications. This is probably the most adequate ren-
dering of my understanding of an extension of the Organon if it were to include
relations.
IV: Logical interpretations of predications turns them into Judgements. Our dis-
tinction between factual and logical interpretation recalls the famous distinction
between judgements de re and judgements de dicto going back to 12th century
7The de Risi references were pointed pout to me by Prof.M.Beeson.
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Scholastics, when Peter Abelard derived de dicto from de re, as we do. 8
V: Our modelling addressed the semantics of E and EΛ and not its deductions. But
this is another chapter.
Apologia and Dedication
Who knows how Aristotle would react to my experiment. I picture him and Eu-
clid as little Raffael-angels looking down on our travails with mischievous interest.
My interpretation is based on my individual reading of his Organon. Individual
does not mean indivisible; I may have had two minds about a number of things.
Also, while I avoided the pitfalls of turning the logical connectives into predicates
and moreover turn syllogisms themselves into statements, I do not propose to justify
this here.
Finally, I claim the privilege of a very old man and refrain from the labours of
performing all the verifications and of following up my own suggestions. Let the
friendly reader smile and forgive. Here, thanks are due to Michael Beeson whose
detailed comments on the manuscript were very helpful.
I dedicate this little essay to all my friends and students who troubled themselves
to remember me and my birthday at the symposium in Zurich, early 2020. And
to all those that could not be present because of the distances that destiny put
between us, in particular to my late friend and colleague Ernst Specker whom this
symposium was meant to honour too. Special mention goes to the three organisers
Gerhard Jaeger, Reinhard Kahle and Giovanni Sommaruga, the sponsors that they
found, and to my alma mater, the ETH, for its hospitality.
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